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Formal political theory has taken a dismal view of communication by politicians: If talk is cheap in elections then candidates are willing to say whatever it takes to get elected. Therefore, the argument goes, nobody should expect campaign speeches to convey useful information. This argument does not comport with empirical evidence, which suggests that what politicians say is a good predictor of what they will do in office. 1 The tension between cheap talk models of electoral communication and empirical work on electoral communication is widely recognized. Recent books on political communication draw this contrast clearly:
Perhaps most surprising of all is that constituents trust the content of legislators' messages. After all, in a principal-agent relationship, this sort of reporting would be costless cheap-talk that strategic principals would dismiss as uninformative signaling. (Grimmer, 2013, p. 24-25) ...contrary to the conventional wisdom that candidates' appeals are just 'cheap talk,' campaigns actually have a lasting legacy in the content of representatives' and senators' behavior in office. (Sulkin, 2011, Frontmatter) Since political scientists presume that cheap talk is uninformative in elections, we often take informative statements by candidates as evidence of the effects of some other mechanism such as repeated elections 2 or screening by political parties. 3 I argue that the conventional wisdom about cheap talk in elections is misleading. Using a game-theoretic model of multidimensional electoral competition with asymmetric information about candidates ' and voters' preferences, I show that campaign speeches may be informative even in one-shot elections when talk is cheap. The key insight driving this conclusion is that candidates can reveal directional information about their preferences without 1 For instance, Sulkin (2011) and Grimmer (2013) each show evidence that legislators' communications to constituents are good predictors of their policy priorities once in office.
2 See, for instance, Harrington (1993) and Aragonès, Postlewaite and Palfrey (2007) . 3 See, for instance, Snyder and Ting (2002) or Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) .
revealing which candidate is more moderate. For instance, candidates may truthfully make statements such as "I am economically liberal, socially conservative, and a hawk on national defense." Since the candidates do not know the exact preferences of the electorate they are uncertain ex ante about which messages will cause them to win the election. However, once the voters' preferences are known, the vote goes clearly for one candidate or the other and the information in the messages improves the welfare of the voters.
The results contribute to scholarly understanding of elections in two ways. First, the results imply that scholars should think of informative campaigns as a natural outcome of elections rather than as an aberration induced only by some other mechanism. This point also affects theories about elections that do not resemble cheap talk since uninformative signaling has served as the implicit counterfactual against which we have evaluated the effects of institutions presumed to cause informative campaigning.
Second, the model provides qualitative predictions about the content of candidates' campaign messages. Candidates describe their policy positions in terms of their direction away from the center. On the surface this seems contrary to intuition about spatial competition; after all, all candidates would prefer to be viewed as centrists. Announcements of centrist policy positions, however, are not credible. If voters believed candidates when they claimed to be centrists, then all candidates would make such claims and voters would be irrational to believe them. In previous models the same logic meant that informative cheap talk was impossible in elections, but here it simply changes the nature of the information that voters receive: voters can distinguish economic liberals from economic conservatives and social conservatives from civil libertarians, but not moderates from extremists. Furthermore, a special case of the model provides predictions about issue selection in campaigns:
candidates may endogenously define issue dimensions along which they can more credibly reveal their positions.
Elections with incomplete information
This study contributes to the existing theoretical literature on elections with incomplete information. The Hotelling-Downs spatial model of electoral competition assumed that candidates were required to fulfill their campaign promises. As a result, classic models sidestepped a central issue concerning elections, which is whether candidates have an incentive to reveal truthful information about their policy intentions. To address this issue, scholars developed models of electoral competition between policy-motivated candidates in which voters had incomplete information about candidates' policy intentions. These models explained the heart of candidates' credibility problem very clearly: since candidates have an incentive to say whatever it takes to win, a rational voter cannot always take
candidates' messages at face value.
Cheap talk and uninformative signaling
The foundation of theories of electoral communication is the cheap talk model. In cheap talk models there are no costs to the candidate for lying, no verifiability of information, and no mechanism for making politicians accountable for inaccurate information. Since electoral institutions can be put in place to make lying costly and verifiable or to provide accountability, the cheap talk model is foundational in the sense that it provides a baseline against which the effects of these institutions can be judged. Early work on electoral cheap talk reached a stark conclusion: when talk is cheap, there can be no information transmission from candidates to voters (Harrington, 1992) . It follows that any meaningful campaign communication is attributable to institutional deviations from the cheap talk setting.
The study of information in elections is organized in part around the apparent failure of information transmission under cheap talk. The theoretical literature has focused on providing institutional and behavioral mechanisms to permit information transmission from candidates to voters. The most straightforward mechanism is to assume that candidates face costs for lying. Substantively, lying costs must often be fairly high in order to induce informative campaign messages. For instance, Banks's (1990) result establishing partially informative campaign messages requires that lying costs are high enough that some extreme types would rather lose the election than falsely announce a moderate position. However, Callander and Wilkie (2007) and Kartik and McAfee (2007) each show that the existence of some candidates for whom lying is costly can induce informative campaigning from cheap talking candidates. 4
Institutions promoting information transmission
The theoretical literature also analyzes the role that various electoral institutions play in encouraging informative campaigning. For instance, repeated elections may encourage truth telling by allowing voters to punish liars and party labels may provide a costly signal that lends credibility to certain policy claims. However, when we interpret these theories against the baseline of uninformative cheap talk, it is difficult to fully account for relevant empirical facts. Furthermore, we risk overestimating the causal effects of these institutions for promoting information transmission when we treat uninformative signals as the counterfactual outcome in the absence of those institutions.
The hypothesis that repeated elections create incentives for truth-telling is intuitively appealing since incumbents frequently face accusations of breaking their campaign promises.
Formal theorists have explored this mechanism. Harrington (1993) showed that reelection incentives can induce truthful campaigns provided that voters' preferences are sufficiently responsive to incumbents' performance in office. Aragonès, Postlewaite and Palfrey (2007) (Sulkin, 2011) . 5 Furthermore, citizens often pay little attention to candidate behavior in office and frequently cannot identify their legislators' votes even on high profile roll calls (Dancey and Sheagley, 2013 ) so voters are unlikely to respond to politicians' behavior enough for reelection incentives alone to account for the informational value of campaigns. This paper shows that candidates can make credible policy promises without any accountability but that a lack of accountability limits the nature of information candidates will reveal.
Political parties may also provide a mechanism for informing voters. According to theories of informative party labels, political parties adopt practices that make it costly for candidates to adopt party labels if they do not agree with the party's positions (Snyder and Ting, 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008) . Critically, these theories depend on the existence of party affiliation costs, which are interpreted as arising from party discipline or from efforts by parties to screen candidates. Thus, weak parties who do not screen candidates or impose party discipline should not be associated with informative labels.
Furthermore, candidates should not be expected to reveal information beyond what is communicated by their party labels. In contrast, I show that party screening is not necessary to make candidates adopt informative labels.
5 Sulkin (2011) alludes to the same point when discussing this finding: "The most common view in the literature on legislative behavior and representation is that more vulnerable legislators...should also be the mostly likely to engage in high levels of reelection-promoting behavior. This argument suggests a negative relationship between vote shares in the previous election and subsequent levels of promise keeping....though, this hypothesis presumes that legislators do not want to follow through on their appeals, and do so only because of electoral imperatives. If they raise issues at least in part because of their genuine interest in them, this logic unravels a bit" (p. 132).
Theoretical precedents for my argument
A key difference between my analysis of electoral cheap talk and some previous work is that candidates' ideal points are drawn from a continuous rather than a discrete distribution. Harrington (1992) , for example, points out that a discrete type space for candidates is necessary for the result that cheap talk is always uninformative in elections. If utility functions and type distributions are both continuous, he suggests that "there always exist two messages which yield the same probability of winning the election" (p.143). Thus, Harrington anticipated the one-dimensional result in this paper (Theorem 1). I more fully develop this intuition before extending it to multiple dimensions in a variety of ways.
Though this study provides a novel theoretical argument for informative cheap talk in elections, other recent work has reached similar conclusions using other mechanisms.
Van Weelden and Kartik (2015) show that candidates may reveal their preferences to voters using cheap talk as a way to credibly commit to future policies and avoid temptations for pandering. The basis for informative communication in Van Weelden and Kartik (2015) is different from this paper: in their study, candidates reveal themselves to be non-congruent in order to eliminate the incentive to choose bad policies later on. In my model, candidates plan to implement their ideal points no matter what they said in the election.
The mechanism for information transmission in my model is most closely related to a non-electoral model by Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) . One way of understanding why electoral cheap talk is especially difficult is that candidates' preferences over voters' actions are independent of their type. Though persuasion often requires that the speaker's preferred actions respond to information in a similar way to the receiver's (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) , candidates prefer to be elected no matter their policy intentions. However, Chakraborty and Harbaugh's (2010) All players' ideal points are private information. The players believe that the candidates' ideal points are independently and identically distributed from an absolutely continuous probability measure F with density f and that voters' ideal points are independently and identically distributed according to an absolutely continuous probability measure G.
A strong assumption in this model is that the candidates' ideal points have the same 6 The fact that candidates are policy-motivated and cannot commit to policy platforms makes this model similar to citizen-candidate models of electoral competition (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). prior distribution. I maintain this assumption for two reasons. First, the case of ex ante identical candidates best facilitates comparison to previous work (e.g. Harrington (1992) , Banks (1990) ). Second, some initial differences between candidates are driven by candidate choices (for example, party labels) which much of the literature treats as products of equilibrium rather than exogenous characteristics. To focus on informational incentives for candidates to differentiate themselves, it is useful to start with undifferentiated candidates. However, the model does not capture differences in the appearance or background of candidates that may cause beliefs about the candidates to diverge. 
The meanings of the candidates' messages are determined only by the sets of types who would send those messages in equilibrium. Therefore, the analysis is concerned with the the sets S(m) induced by the messages rather than the messages themselves. If S(m) = S, the message m is meant to convey the information "My ideal point is somewhere in the set S." In reality, the candidate would likely use more natural language such as "I am economically liberal and socially conservative" or "I prefer to increase spending on food stamps twice as much as on science funding." The effect of these messages is to inform the voter by reducing the set of preferences that the candidate might hold.
Since messages are costless, candidates are exactly indifferent between messages in equilibrium. This feature of cheap talk equilibria means that the predictions can be taken as lower bounds on electoral information transmission: the equilibria should be interpreted as statements about how much information transmission is possible when nothing is nudging 7 As is common in the analysis cheap talk games, I largely ignore off-path beliefs. All of the equilibria could be supported, for instance, by off-path beliefs in which unused messages are interpreted as being identical to the nearest equilibrium message. Alternatively, the candidates' strategies could easily be converted to mixed strategies that eliminate the possibility of off-path signals without changing the equilibrium outcomes. them toward sending truthful messages. However, the equilibria can be strengthened by departures from the cheap talk assumptions. For instance, if candidates experience any cost of lying (that is, sending a message m such that z j ∈ S(m)) then the predictions are unchanged except that they become strict equilibria.
I will focus on equilibria in which all pairs of messages give both candidates the same probability of victory. Since the candidates are policy-motivated and care about the policy selected by their opponent when they lose, there are likely to be some perfect Bayesian equilibria that do not have this property. In some strategy profiles, candidates may be willing to accept a lower overall probability of victory in order to reduce the probability of losing to opponent types that are far from their ideal points. As Lemma 1 in Appendix B demonstrates, any profile that equalizes victory probabilities across all pairs of messages is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the game. The reason is that every message a candidate could send gives her an equal probability of winning against all types of opponents. Therefore, in these strategy profiles, switching to a new message cannot change a candidate's probability of victory or her distribution of opponents conditional on losing.
Equilibria that equalize candidates' victory probabilities across pairs of messages are more attractive in a couple of ways. First, these equilibria are robust to adding in office motivation for candidates. Second, equilibria that equalize victory probabilities for all pairs of messages are not sensitive to the sequence of the game: candidates do not want to switch messages after they learn their opponents' message, so the predictions are invariant to the arbitrary choice of whether communication is simultaneous or sequential. In contrast to both of these points, equilibria in which candidates do not maximize victory probabilities can be destroyed by adding office motivation or changing the sequence of the game.
The analysis uses the model to make two main arguments. First, informative cheap talk equilibria exist. In these equilibria, candidates reveal directional information about their policy intentions but leave voters uncertain about which candidate is more moderate. Second, under common distributional assumptions, the candidates reveal binary positions along orthogonal ideological dimensions. Under stronger assumptions, candidates perfectly reveal the directions of their ideal points from the center.
Existence of informative equilibria
In order to argue for the existence of informative cheap talk in elections, I will begin by characterizing binary announcement equilibria in which candidates reveal themselves to be in one of two camps based on the realizations of their ideal points. The following examples illustrate such equilibria in one and two dimensions.
Example 1. Consider a one-dimensional policy space -for example, a left-right fiscal policy scale -and assume that candidates' and voters' ideal points are drawn from normal distributions centered at zero. 8 In this setting, there is an equilibrium in which each candidate accurately reveals whether her ideal point lies to the left or the right of zero. Thus, the candidates communicate directional information about their preferences without revealing the intensity of their preferences in that direction.
To see why this is an equilibrium, consider what happens when one candidate announces "My ideal point is left of center" and the other announces "My ideal point is right of center" as displayed in Figure 1 . Given these messages, the voters still expect the candidates to be equally extreme. As a result, left-of-center voters prefer the left-wing candidate and right-of-center voters prefer the right-wing candidate. Since the distribution of voters' ideal points is symmetric and the candidates remain uncertain about voter preferences, this means that each candidate expects to win the election with a probability of one half. Similarly, if both candidates are on the same side then they will make the same announcement, in which case all voters are indifferent between candidates. Thus, the voters may randomize between candidates and each still expect to win with probability one half. In either case, neither candidate has an incentive to deviate to a dishonest campaign message since the probability of winning is constant for all possible pairs of messages. Furthermore, even though the candidates have the same expected probability of winning before they know the voters' ideal points, the voters gain from campaign speech in expectation since the ex post winner of the election is the candidate that would move policy in the direction preferred by a majority of voters. Example 2. Now assume that the policy space is two dimensional. In addition to fiscal policy, voters care about candidates' stances on foreign policy, which can be summarized by a scale along which higher numbers are more interventionist. Candidates' and voters' ideal points are distributed according to some continuous distributions on R 2 . In this situation, there is an equilibrium of the following form: a line divides the policy space into two half spaces and both candidates accurately reveal which half space contains their ideal points.
The substantive interpretation of the messages depends on the angle and position of the dividing line which are functions of the ideal point distributions, but one example is displayed in Figure 2 . In this example, the line has a negative slope and cuts through the middle of the upper left and lower right quadrants of the space, so we can interpret the messages as distinguishing economically conservative hawks from economically liberal doves.
Following the logic of Example 1, an equilibrium dividing line must equalize the probability of winning for both candidates given any pair of messages. To see that such a line always exist, consider any line ℓ passing through a point x ′ . For such a line, there is some probability that a candidate revealed to be "above" the line beats a candidate revealed to be "below" the line. If this probability equals one half then it is an equilibrium dividing line. Otherwise, suppose this probability is equal to P < 1 2 . Consider what happens when ℓ is rotated around the axis x ′ . The relevant probability changes continuously with the angle of rotation. Furthermore, once we have rotated the line 180 degrees, the two sides of the line are simply flipped and the probability that the candidate "above" the line wins over the candidate "below" is equal to 1 − P > 1 2 . By continuity, there must have been an angle of rotation that equalized the probability of winning the election for candidates on either side of the line. Furthermore, when the candidates are on the same side, the voters are indifferent and the candidates have the same probability of winning. Therefore, there is an informative equilibrium to this game since the probability of winning is equal for all pairs of messages.
The types of equilibria illustrated by Examples 1 and 2 exist under very general conditions. To set up the results, let P(S, S ′ ) be the victory probability of a candidate who reveals her ideal point to be in the set S when her opponent's ideal point is revealed to be in the set S ′ . 9 Theorem 1 states that, when the policy space is one-dimensional, there exists a binary announcement informative equilibrium as long as candidates are worse off when they are revealed to have ideal points on the extreme left or extreme right. 10 This condition is met, for example, when the set of possible candidate ideal points is unbounded or when the bounds are sufficiently far from the mean of the voters' distribution. 10 This is also a necessary condition for existence of a cutpoint equilibrium. For instance, if there does not exist a numberz > 0 such that P({z : z >z}, {z : z <z}) < 1 2 , then the candidates would strictly prefer to claim that they were to the right of every possible cutpoint.
right of some cutpoint.
The proof of Theorem 1 is a simple application of the intermediate value theorem: at some point near the extreme left, it must be that voters are more likely to prefer a lottery over candidates to the right of that point than a lottery over candidates to the left. At some point near the extreme right, the opposite is true. Therefore, by continuity, there must be some point in the middle that gives the candidates equal probabilities of victory. This profile equalizes the probability of victory for all pairs of messages.
Existence of informative equilibria extends easily to the multidimensional case. Theorem 2 generalizes the equilibrium from Example 2 to any multidimensional policy space.
In more than two dimensions the dividing line from Example 2 is replaced with a hyperplane but the argument is the same: the hyperplane divides the policy space into two half spaces that are equally likely to be preferred by a majority of voters. 
The equilibrium and proof for Theorem 2 is very closely related to Chakraborty and
Harbaugh's (2010) result on comparative cheap talk in two or more dimensions. Like their result, my proof is based on the observation that any hyperplane can be rotated such that it divides the space into two half-spaces providing equal utility to the sender(s). The model in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) includes only one sender so Theorem 2 can be seen as an application of their result to a setting with multiple senders. The border conditions needed for Theorem 1 are not necessary in the multidimensional case since the dividing hyperplane is found by rotating around an axis rather than moving from one extreme of the distribution to another.
The dividing hyperplanes in the construction of Theorem 2 need not be unique. Depending on the distribution of candidates' ideal points there may be many different binary announcement equilibria or even an infinite number (such as under the assumptions in section 3.2.2).
Equilibrium characterization
Equilibria with binary announcements were used to demonstrate that informative equilibria generally exist. However, in multidimensional policy spaces these may not be the most informative equilibria to the game, as the following examples demonstrate. The contours of this distribution are represented by the ellipses in Figure 3 . In this game, there is an equilibrium with four distinct messages corresponding roughly to "economically left, military moderate", "economically moderate dove," "economically moderate hawk," "economically right, military moderate," as illustrated in Figure 3 . 11 The regions corresponding to each message are defined by rotating the axes until the corresponding dimensions are uncorrelated with each other. Such a rotation is possible due to symmetry properties of the multivariate normal distribution, as I will clarify below. In this new rotated space, each quadrant has an equal expected distance from the mean of the voters' ideal point distribution. Therefore, each voter prefers the candidate revealed to be in the nearest quadrant. Following any pair of messages the set of ideal point realizations leading a voter to prefer candidate A to candidate B is divided by a line passing through the origin. Furthermore, the probability that a voter falls to one side of the line is equal to one half. Thus, for any pair of quadrants that the candidates reveal, both candidates expect to win the election with a probability of one half.
Example 4. Consider the same election but assume that players' ideal points are not correlated across dimensions. To represent this idea, assume that all players' ideal points are distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of (0, 0) ′ and a covariance matrix equal to the 2 × 2 identity matrix. That is, each player's ideal point in two dimensions consists of two numbers, each drawn independently from a standard normal distribution. The contours of this distribution are represented by the circles in Figure 4 .
The direction of a candidate's ideal point from the center in two dimensions is a ray starting from (0, 0) and passing through the candidate's ideal point. This is represented by an angle, ranging from 0 to 2π when measured in radians and ranging from 0 to 360 when measured in degrees. There is an equilibrium to this game in which each candidate perfectly reveals this direction.
To see why this is an equilibrium, consider a situation in which the candidates reveal the two rays shown in Figure 4 . Given this information, the voters expect the candidates to be equally extreme in their chosen directions and therefore choose the candidate that would move policy in the direction most similar to their own. 12 Thus, the voters for each candidate are divided by a line passing through the center which, because of the symmetry of the voter distribution, divides the voter distribution exactly in half. Hence, each candidate expects to win the election with a probability of one half. Furthermore, this holds for any two rays that the candidates may reveal, so it is an equilibrium for all candidates to fully reveal their directions from the center.
As Examples 3 and 4 illustrate, electoral cheap talk may reveal very detailed directional information about candidates' preferences under some conditions. These outcomes depend on the distribution of voters' and candidates' ideal points but the required assumptions are consistent with many empirical spatial models of candidate and voter preferences.
Principal orthant equilibria
I first characterize equilibria of the type described in Example 3. In more than two dimensions, the four quadrants of Example 3 are replaced by 2 d orthants but the argument is similar. The assumption required for candidate ideal points is that their probability distribution satisfies a version of symmetry that encompasses, for example, all multivariate normal distributions. Specifically, f must belong to the class of elliptical distributions: (Liu, 1988) : any hyperplane passing through (0, . . ., 0) divides R d into two half spaces with equal probability under G.
An equivalent statement of Assumption 2 is that z i /||z i || and −z i /||z i || have the same distribution. Assumption 2 is weaker than Assumption 1 because all elliptical distributions are angularly symmetric but some angularly symmetric distributions are not elliptical. 13 A strong aspect of Assumptions 1 and 2 is that the voter and candidate distribution are symmetric about the same point. This would hold, for instance, in a model in which candidates are randomly drawn from the pool of voters.
To characterize the type of equilibrium described in Example 3, we need a general description of how candidates may rotate the issue dimensions in order to credibly reveal information. Let QΛQ −1 = Σ be an eigendecomposition of the matrix Σ, where Λ is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements equal to the eigenvalues of Σ, and the columns of Q are the corresponding eigenvectors. This decomposition is useful because any two dimensions in the distribution of Qz are orthogonal. Furthermore, Q can be chosen to be a rotation matrix so that Qz can be interpreted as the coordinates of z when the axes of the space are rotated according to the eigenvalues of Σ. These new axes represent, in statistical parlance, the principal components of the distribution f and, in geometric terms, the principal axes of the ellipsoids formed by the contours of f . Theorem 3 implies that there is an equilibrium that partitions the policy space into 2 d convex sets. Since all ideal points along the same ray from the origin belong to the same principal orthant, principal orthant equilibria partially reveal the direction of each candidate from the center. Construction of a principal orthant equilibrium rests on the following property: given any pair of distinct messages in such a strategy profile, the sets of voter ideal points preferring the two candidates are divided by a hyperplane that passes through the origin of the policy space. By Assumption 2, any such distribution divides the voters' ideal point distribution in half.
Assuming the principal components of the ideal point distributions are well-understood by the voters, principal orthant equilibria are intuitive since they correspond to statements such as "I am socially conservative and economically liberal." In fact, since the first principal components explain the most variance in political preferences, there is reason to believe that these dimensions are the most likely to correspond to how voters think about politics.
This argument is the motivation behind principal component analysis, factor analysis, and related methods which have been used to measure voters' political ideology in empirical work for decades (Schofield, Gallego and Jeon, 2011; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977) .
Full directional equilibria
As Example 4 demonstrated, there may also be a full directional equilibrium in which candidates fully reveal the direction of their ideal points from the center. In contrast to the principal orthant equilibria of Theorem 3, these equilibria exist only under relatively strong distributional assumptions. However, a discussion of full directional equilibria is valuable because it provides the starkest illustration of some principles of directional equilibria that are at work in the more general versions of the model. The full directional equilibria can be viewed as an outcome under the extreme case in which the candidates' ideal point distribution reaches perfect symmetry.
The distributional assumption required for candidate ideal points is spherical symmetry, which is defined below.
Assumption 3. The candidate distribution f is spherically symmetric around the point
where f 0 is continuous and non-negative and the scale parameter Σ is a d × d identity matrix and c is a normalizing constant.
Assumption 3 is strictly stronger than Assumption 1: spherical symmetry is obtained by replacing the covariance matrix of an elliptical distribution with an identity matrix. For Assumption 3 to be satisfied there can be no correlation across dimensions and the variances on each dimension should be equal. Importantly, spherical symmetry also implies that the density along any ray away from the origin is the same. No additional assumptions are required for the distribution of voters' ideal points.
for all i ∈ {1, . . ., d − 1} and
These are the angular components of the hyperspherical coordinates of z. The function φ (z) determines which point on the unit sphere lies on the same ray from the origin as the point z.
A full directional equilibrium is one in which the candidates fully reveal the direction of their ideal points and nothing more. Since the specific messages chosen by the candidate are not of interest, it is convenient to consider candidate strategies that place positive probability only on messages on the unit hypersphere. Thus, a full directional equilibrium Full directional equilibria clearly fall short of full revelation in other ways. Voters are unable to distinguish between moderate and extreme candidates. Therefore, there is a chance that voters will make mistakes even in this limiting case. However, the winner of the election will be the candidate who would move policy in the precise direction preferred by the majority of voters.
Discussion and Conclusions
An important line of research in political science asks under what conditions candidates can credibly reveal their policy intentions to voters. The most common understanding is that "cheap talk" campaigns should be completely uninformative and therefore repeated elections, informative party labels, or some other institution is needed to allow voters any opportunity to be informed. Using a formal model of electoral competition under incomplete information, I show that such institutions are not a necessary condition for campaigns to transmit information to voters. Instead, candidates will credibly reveal directional information about their policy preferences even in one-shot elections when talk is cheap.
The model assumes that candidates' and voters' ideal points are private information.
This means that candidates are uncertain about which message would win the election.
Though candidates believe that each message gives them an equal probability of victory before learning the voters' ideal points, the actual winner will be the candidate who offers the best expected payoff to a majority of voters given their realized ideal points. There is strong empirical evidence that politicians' communications to constituents are good predictors of their policy priorities in office (Sulkin, 2011; Grimmer, 2013) . Though this finding is generally taken as evidence that reelection pressures bind candidates to tell the truth 14 or that voters nonstrategic, 15 this study shows that such findings are easily rationalized in some single-shot elections where lying is costless and voters are perfectly rational.
One proposed remedy to the supposed failure of cheap talk campaigns is informative party labels (Snyder and Ting, 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008) . In theories of informative parties, party leaders engage in screening activity to make adopting the party label a costly signal for candidates. This study demonstrates similar party labels could emerge even if parties engage in no screening and labels are pure cheap talk. In fact, the binary announcement equilibria of Theorems 1 and 2 could easily be interpreted as information conveyed by party labels. Furthermore, under common assumptions, candidates may reveal much more information than is captured by party labels (such as the orthants 14 See Sulkin (2011), Chapter 2. 15 In explaining his findings, Grimmer (2013) states: "While often useful for understanding bargaining, cheap talk models are unlikely to describe well how constituents access legislators' messages. Constituents...are unlikely to exert the cognitive effort to think strategically about how legislators are broadcasting information" (p.25).
of Theorem 3) so campaign speeches could continue to influence voters' beliefs even when party labels are informative.
One special case of the model also provides qualitative predictions about how candidates talk about policy in campaigns. Candidates reveal information about the direction of their preferences from the center without revealing whether their preferences are moderate or extreme in that direction. Furthermore, candidates reveal information about their preferences along orthogonal ideological dimensions that cut across issues. Thus, candidates and voters endogenously talk about issues in ideological terms that correspond well to political scientists' empirical notions of ideology.
In the text, P(S, S ′ ) is defined as the victory probability of a candidate revealed to be in the set S ⊆ R d when the other candidate is revealed to be in the set S ′ ⊆ R d . For the sake of completeness, I will now fully define this probability and make a couple of observations about its properties.
denote the set of voter ideal points at which a voter would prefer a candidate revealed to be in S to one revealed to be in S ′ . Thus, G(T (S, S ′ )) is the probability that a particular voter prefers a candidate revealed to be in S to one revealed to be in S ′ . Therefore, we have
Note that P(S, S ′ ) is continuous with respect to the parameter G(T (S, S ′ )). Furthermore, since G is absolutely continuous, P(S, S ′ ) is continuous with respect to changes in S and S ′ .
B Proofs of Results

Lemma 1. If σ is such that P(S(m), S(m
show that σ is an equilibrium signaling strategy we will prove that both candidates are indifferent between all messages, which shows that they have no strict incentive to deviate from σ . Since the results should apply to games with sequential as well as simultaneous messages, we will consider two cases separately: one in which the candidate knows her opponent's message (such as when she is the second sender in the sequential game), and another in which she does not (such as when she is the first sender in the sequential game, or either sender in the simultaneous game). The proofs for both cases are below.
1. The expected utility to candidate j ∈ {A, B} for sending any message m ∈ R d given that the other candidate k =∈ {A, B}\{ j} sends the message m ′ is
since the candidate wins and implements her ideal point with probability 1 2 (by our assumption on P(·)), loses with probability 1 2 , and her beliefs about her opponents ideal point are derived from Bayesian updating on m ′ . Since this payoff does not depend on m, candidate j is indifferent over messages.
2. The total probability that a candidate k ∈ {A, B} sends a message m ∈ R d is equal to Pr[m k = m] = S(m) f (z)dz. Let supp(σ ) denote the support of σ . The expected utility to candidate j ∈ {A, B} for sending any message m ∈ R d given that she does not know the message chosen by her opponent k =∈ {A, B}\{ j} is By the intermediate value theorem, there must exist a point z * ∈ (−z,ẑ) such that
Thus, there exists a binary announcement informative equilibrium in which both candidates use a cutoff strategy of κ = z * .
Theorem 2 Proof. Let y = Qz = (y 1 , . . ., y d ). Since Σ is a symmetric real matrix, Q is an orthogonal matrix, meaning that Q ′ Q = I d . Some algebraic manipulation shows that
Since Λ −1 is a diagonal matrix, this implies that the dimensions of Qz are distributed independently and we can write
where f j is the marginal density of y j . Furthermore, since f (y) = f (−y), we have 
The set of z i satisfying this condition defines an open halfspace with (0, . . . , 0) on the boundary. Since G is angularly symmetric, this implies that each candidate expects to gain any voter's support with probability 1 2 . Since this holds for any pair of principal orthants, no candidate has a strict incentive to deviate from this strategy.
Theorem 4 There exists a full directional equilibrium under Assumptions 2 and 3.
Proof. If Σ = kI d then z ′ Σz = k||z|| 2 for all z ∈ R d . Thus, we can write f (z) = f * (||z||) where the domain of f * (||z||) is R + . For any z andz, let θ (z,z) be the angle enclosed by the two vectors.
By the law of cosines, ||z −z|| 2 = ||z|| 2 + ||z|| 2 − 2||z||||z|| cos θ (z,z).
Thus, the expected utility to voter i from electing a candidate j ∈ {A, B} using the full
